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Up until June of 1940, if a dispute arose between an em-
ployer and employee, in a purely intrastate business or industry,
the possibility of a strike or lockout, picketing and boycott, was
almost a certainty. The public, regardless of how adversely
affected, could do nothing, save look on and hope that an agree-
ment would be reached. Even though one of the parties to the
disagreement was most willing to compromise, he could do
nothing against an obdurate opponent. Today there is on the
statute books of Kentucky a new law, Acts of 1940, c. 105,
effective June 12, 1940, providing some relief. This act,
entitled Employer-Employee Relations, as originally offered to
the legislature was a "little Wagner Act" and a "little Norris-
LaGuardia Act" combined. As it stands, it is neither one nor
the other. "Unfair" Acts are condemned as against public
policy. But, what are unfair acts? The statute does not say.
Will the courts have to decide? Where shall they go for
guidance? What sort of relief shall they grant when, as, and
if they do find "unfair" acts? Unfortunately, an over-zealous
legislature pulled the teeth of the "Wagner Act'-they cut out
the definitions of what activities should be considered "unfair".
With respect to the use of restraining orders in labor disputes,
the preamble of the Act shows that the availability of this pro-
cedural device was to be seriously curtailed. 1 In the Statute as
it stands there is no restriction on the use of the injunction in
labor disputes. In fine and eloquent language the statute sets
forth the public policy relating to practices affecting employer-
employee relations. The right to organize, to strike, to bargain
collectively, to engage in peaceful picketing, to assemble col-
lectively for peaceful purposes, are declared to be the law of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville, School of
Law; A. B., 1931, Dartmouth College (cum laude); LL. B., 1935, Cor-
nell University; Instructor in law, University of Louisville, 1936-37;
Assistant Professor of Law, 1937-38; Associate Professor of Law since
1938. Sabbatical leave, University of Michigan, 1939-40.
1 See, "Preamble", Chap. 105, Kentucky Acts 1940, p. 414.
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this Commonwealth. It is sufficient to note that each and every
one of these provisions is, and was, the law of Kentucky, as
found in opinions of the Court of Appeals.2
However, this new act does make several important con-
tributions to Kentucky labor law. It does provide for concilia-
tion and mediation in labor disputes. This is a real step for-
ward, and, although the step is but a short one, it may prove to
be the start towards better things. A second important change
has to do with arbitration as a result of this act. Of this, more
later.
As early as 1863 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that laborers had the right to organize, to work together to
improve their conditions.3 This was an important victory. But,
it did not settle a question which has proved to be a most
important source of labor strife-the right of an employer to
discharge an employee for union activities. In fact, this right
has been since recognized by our Court of Appeals.4 And so,
there has existed, side by side, the right to join a union and the
right to discharge for joining a union. Strikes, lockouts and
other sorts of labor troubles can be traced directly to these con-
flicting rights. Recognition of this has been the moving force
behind the efforts of those who have devised our machinery for
peaceful solution of labor problems. One of these rights must
go. The trend has been towards the elimination of the right
of an employer to discharge an employee for indulging in his,
the employee's, right to join a union. One of the first steps in
this direction was formulated during the First World War while
the federal government was operating the railroads. General
Order No. 8 of the Director General of the railroads provided
for the right of self-organization by workers without discrimina-
tion.5 The National Labor Relations Act 6 (N.L.R.A.) repre-
sents the extension of this policy of promotion of self-organiza-
tion and collective bargaining to the much broader and more
See G. N. Stevens, "The Development of Labor Law in Ken-
tucky" (1940) 28 Kentucky Law Journal 160 et seq.
I Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent Association, 62 Ky. 143
(1863). See also 28 Ky. L. J. 160, 165, supra n. 2.
4See language in Saulsberry v. Coopers International Union,
147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. 1018 (1912); Diamond Block Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers of America, 188 Ky. 477, 222 S. W. 1079 (1920).
Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., "Labor and the Government,"
(1935), p. 177.
'49 Stat. at L. 449.
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inclusive non-carrier fields. Seven states, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah and
Wisconsin, have adopted "little" Wagner Acts. 7 And while
the approach to the problem differs in each act, the underlying
theory is the same-that peaceful settlement of labor disputes
becomes increasingly more difficult, and less probable, if unions
are not allowed to organize, free from employer interference,
and free from the fear of discharge for exercising a recognized,
but heretofore unprotected right.
It is quite apparent from a study of the case law in the
industrial states that the mere right to organize, unsupported
by legislation actively protecting the right, is almost meaning-
less. The time factor involved in a court action wherein the
union may successfully reaffirm its right is usually sufficient to
defeat the union as a practical matter. The weakness of the
new Kentucky law lies in that it does not say what shall be
deemed unfair acts. In view of the present state of the case law
it would seem very unlikely that the court would on its own
initiative hold that the employer who discharges for union
activity has engaged in an unfair labor practice. The law in
that respect was not changed by the statute. The possibility of
friction on that score still continues.
However, that is but one of many grounds for labor dispute.
If the parties involved get together and settle their difference,
the public cares little how they do it. But, where the parties
refuse to deal, and where, as a result, not only the parties, but
the general public, is affected thereby, a different problem arises.
Should the public, through its governmental agencies, intervene?
To what extent should it intervene? How to do this? Broadly,
the possibilities are these-the creation of a board with power to
conciliate, mediate and/or arbitrate in labor disputes.
In the Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, June 30,
1936, at p. 9, these terms are defined as follows: "Conciliation:
Conciliation is an attempt by third party to bring about an
amicable solution of the differences involved, but without power
to settle them. Mediation: If the workers and the employers
agree to submit their disputes to a third party, the procedure
is called mediation. Arbitration: When the employers and the
SSee collection of such statutes, Smith and De Lancey, "The State
Legislatures and Unionism" (1940) 38 Mich. L. R. 987, 996.
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workers in submitting their disputes to a mediation board also
agree to abide by the decision of the board, the procedure is
called arbitration."
As for Conciliation: The Conciliation Service of the Depart-
ment of Labor is the oustanding example of the successful
application of this approach. The Conciliation Service was pro-
vided for in the Act of March 4, 1913,8 which created the Depart-
ment of Labor. The act authorized the Secretary of Labor to
act as mediator in labor disputes and to appoint conciliators.
In the Commerce Clearing House, Labor Service,9 appears the
following: "The Conciliation Service attempts to adjust disputes
in industries over which the Federal Government has no manda-
tory jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the service, unlike that
of the Railroad Adjustment Board and the National Mkediation
Board in interstate carrier constroversies, is not exclusive. The
Service only intervenes at the request of one of the parties to
the dispute or on request of the state authorities. In its
adjustment work the Service confines itself to mediation and to
the offering of suggestions as to a proper settlement. It is not
a board of arbitration and cannot force either party to a dispute
to confer with its agents." The weakness of this machinery lies
in this, that the Conciliator has no power to intervene; no power
to force the disputants to confer either with its agents or each
other; even when requested by one to intervene, he still has no
power to force the other disputant to confer. And yet, as we all
know, the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor has
achieved a remarkable record of success in the peaceful settle-
ment of labor disputes.U A recent notable example was the
settlement by a Department Conciliator of the strike at the
Vultee Aircraft plant in California. The opponents of this
method of approach stress the lack of power to intervene. The
proponents stress the fact that here is an agency to which an
aggrieved party may turn, but need not.
The new Kentucky labor act adopts this approach in part.
It provides ". . . the Commissioner shall have power to act
as conciliator and mediator and to appoint conciliators and
137 Stat. at L. 736 and 738.
'Par. 459.
"o Jaeger, "Cases and Statutes on Labor Law" (1939) 824--"Con-
ciliation. . . . Of 14,889 disputes handled by the United States
Conciliation Service between 1915 and 1936, 11,421 disputes, or over
76%, were satisfactorily adjusted. . .
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mediators in labor disputes, whenever his intervention is
requested by either or both parties to such disputes ... "
And, it goes further, in providing that the Commissioner "may
also offer his services as such conciliator and mediator in case
any emergency by reason of a labor dispute is found to exist at
any time." But, as under the above federal act, the Commis-
sioner cannot proceed, with any effect, unless both parties accept
such conciliation or mediation."
As for Mediation: Legislation creating mediation facilities
proceeds upon the assumption that labor and employers will
observe more faithfully an agreement for which they have
bargained than one which is imposed upon them. The federal
government was, here again, the pioneer with respect to the use
of this approach to peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
Relying on its power to control interstate commerce, and to
regulate interstate carriers thereunder, Congress took its first
steps towards establishing machinery for the peaceful settlement
of labor disputes in the railroad field as a result of the strikes
of 1888. This first act was known as the Arbitration Act of
1888.12 It provided for voluntary arbitration of railroad labor
disputes and for investigation by a commission of the cause of
any dispute in this field. The act failed in its purpose, for,
during the ten years that it remained in effect, the arbitration
provision was never utilized, and the investigation provision was
used but once, in the Pullman strike of 1894.13
The act of 1888 was superseded by the Erdman Act of
1898,14 which retained and strengthened the arbitration pro-
visions of the Arbitration act, but, as in the earlier act, arbitra-
tion remained voluntary. The important addition in the
Erdman act was a provision under which the Commissioner of
Labor and the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, upon application of either party to a dispute, was author-
ized to communicate with the other party to the dispute, and
exercise their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to get
the disputants to settle their difference amicably. And, failing
'Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, May, 1940) Sec. 1599c-29.
25 Star. at L. 501.
See Smith, Cases and other materials on Employer-Employee
Relations (1940) 66 et seq; Jaeger, Cases and Statutes on Labor Law
(1939) 825, footnote 17.
" 30 Stat. at L. 424.
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this, the federal authorities were to try to persuade the parties
to submit to arbitration. This machinery was badly damaged
however, when on the first attempt to apply the mediation and
conciliation provision, the railroad refused to mediate."- But,
later attempts to use it were successful, and proved that
mediation had greater potentialities than arbitration, as a means
of reaching a peaceful solution in a labor controversy. This lead
to the Newlands Act of 1913,16 which set up a permanent Board
of lediation and Conciliation. The Board was empowered to
offer mediation on its own initiative, and, if this proved un-
successful, was authorized to suggest arbitration. In 1920, the
Esch-Cummins Law17 did away with the principle of mediation,
and set up in its place a board upon which would sit representa-
tives of the employer and the employees, who should have the
power to pass on disputes in the first instance. The decisions of
the board were unsupported by any sanction save public
opinion. In Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. U.S. Railroad Labor
Board,'5 it was held that the decisions of the Board were bind-
ing on neither party. However, in U.S. v. Railway Employees'
Dept. of the A.F. of L.,19 an injunction was issued against a
strike which was called to protest a decision of the Labor Board
reducing wages. The court held that the strike was illegal in
that its purpose was to create by this assault a public opinion
hostile to the decision of the board.
The Railway Labor Act of 192620 incorporated the tested
devices of these earlier laws. The policy of mediation was
stressed, by the creation of a nonpartisan Board of
mediation whose primary duty it was to mediate, and,
failing in this, to urge arbitration. Failing in mediation,
and failing in obtaining an agreement to arbitrate, the
act provided for an emergency board of investigation to be
named by the President when recommended by the Board of
Mediation, whereupon no strike or change in the terms or
conditions of employment could be undertaken until thirty days
after the board's report to the President, such report to be made
' See Smith, supra footnote 7, at p. 67, quoting from National
Mediation Board, First Annual Report (1935), appendix B, p. 60.
38 Stat. at L. 103.
41 Stat. at L. 456.
"261 U. S. 72, 67 L. Ed. 536, 43 Sup. Ct. 278 (1923).
' 290 Fed. 978 (D. C. N. D. Ill., 1923).
44 Stat. at L. 577.
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within thirty days of the board appointment. Here is the first
time that the right to strike is prohibited, even temporarily, in
this development. This act even went so far as to put a duty on
both employers and employees to make reasonable efforts to
make and maintain agreements. However, no penalties were
provided for breach of such provision.
Turning to the non-carrier field, your attention is directed
to Sec. 13 of the N.L.R.A., which reads as follows: "Nothing in
this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike." Thus, out of the
carrier field, we find that the federal government has taken a
different approach. It attempts in the N.L.R.A. to eliminate
strife by making certain practices on the part of the employer,
such as interference with union activity, an unfair labor practice
and punishable as such. It does encourage collective bargaining,
and the Board has, unofficially, acted as mediator, but, under
the act there is no such machinery as is found in the railroad
legislation. And so, in non-carrier disputes, the federal govern-
ment falls back on the Conciliation Service of the Labor Depart-
ment.-Witness the procedure in the Vultee strike, for example.
Such is the picture of mediation on the federal side. The
states have also made use of this approach to the peaceful
settlement of labor controversies. According to Professor Smith
of University of Michigan Law School, "Over one-half of the
legislatures have provided for the appointment of mediators
invested with the function of aiding the disputing parties to
make an amicable settlement. The government official may
enter the dispute on his own volition, and, in some states, he may
be under a duty to enter a serious dispute. . . . One of his
biggest clubs may be the force of public opinion, which he will
be required to bring to bear upon the erring party in some states
by issuing a report of blameworthiness.' '21
In Michigan, Minnesota and Colorado temporary suspen-
sion of the right to strike during a designated period is a part
of the mediation program. The government agency, in these
states, has, of course, a right and a duty to investigate all labor
disputes.
Smith and De Lancey, supra footnote 7, at p. 1023-1024.
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In twenty-four states, however, such a limitation on the
right of self-help is not imposed. A recent report by Paul N.
Herzog, member of the New York State Labor Relations Board,
sheds some light on the reason for this variance.2 2
"Government statistics in 1937 disclosed that during recent
years well over half the strikes in the State had resulted from
the refusal of some employers to recognize an already conceded
right-that of their employees to pool their economic strength
by joining labor unions. . . Prior to 1937 employees who felt
injured by such action had no recourse but to use the economic
weapon of the strike, costly to themselves, their employer and
the public alike. Now they need no longer use self-help. The
State Labor Relations Act was designed to diminish the use of
the strike in this particular type of dispute, by providing a
peaceful and orderly alternative through government adjudica-
tion." In a footnote, Mr. Herzog calls attention to Metropolitan
Life Iisurance Company v. Boland,23 which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the act, as an exercise of the police power.
Turning once again to the new Kentucky labor act, it is
apparent that it has failed to clarify, as hereinabove pointed out,
what are unfair labor practices. It has, however, stated a public
policy in favor of amicable settlement of labor disputes by con-
ciliation, mediation and arbitration, and it has provided for a
board of conciliation and mediation which is available on the
request of the disputants. 24 Under the statute, the board is
authorized to tender its services in a labor dispute. If the
parties accept conciliation and mediation the Commissioner
"shall have power, in the course of such conciliation and media-
tion, to hold hearings for the purpose of determining the reason
or re: sons for such labor dispute and receive the testimony of
witnesses under oath; any findings of fact made by him in con-
nection with such hearing shall be reduced to writing and made
a public record of . . ." the Department of Labor. And, further,
the act provides that where the parties have accepted concilia-
tion and mediation "no strike or lockout shall take place or be
put into effect pending the efforts of the Commissioner or his
" "The New York Labor Relations Act in the Development of
Administrative Law" (April, 1940) New York State Bar Association
Bulletin, p. 53, 55 et seq.
280 N. Y. 194, 20 N. E. (2d) 390 (1939).
Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, May, 1940) Sec. 1599c-28.
K. L. J.-4
KENTUCKY LAW JOUMNAL
duly authorized representatives to conciliate and mediate such
dispute." This provision against strike or lockout is binding,
under the act, for a period of fifteen days from the day of
acceptance by the parties of the services of the Commissioner.
It may be further extended by mutual consent of the parties. 25
It should be noted that the right of self-help is not taken away
by the statute. The statute provides that if the parties see fit
to accept the services of the Commissioner in attempting to reach
an agreement, then they must forego the right of self-help for
a period of time during which the Commissioner or his agents
will attempt to solve the problem. The weakness of the act, at
this point, is all too apparent. The Commissioner can act only
when both parties consent; the strike and lockout are restricted
only where the parties agree to restrict themselves. It is
hardly conceivable that the party at fault in a labor dispute
will agree to conciliation and mediation, knowing that the report
of the Commissioner is to become a public record. However,
time will tell whether or not the statute should be changed.
In the interim, we do have a board available for those who
honestly disagree and are really interested in settling points of
dispute and getting back to work. And, there is the possibility
of some pressure on the recalcitrant party through newspaper
publicity to the effect that one of the disputants has requested
the Commissioner to intervene, but that the other has refused
to accept his services.
As for arbitration: Its use might be provided for as a means
of achieving peaceful solutions of labor disputes in either of two
ways-voluntary arbitration or involuntary arbitration. Pro-
vision for voluntary submission to arbitration was made in most
of the federal acts above discussed. Unfortunately, the device
has not been too popular with either employer or employee. The
reason for this lies in the nature of arbitration. At common law
and under existing statutes the award of an arbitrator is bind-
ing on those who have submitted to it voluntarily.2 At com-
mon law, one could withdraw from the arbitration at any time
' Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, May, 1940) supra footnote 24,
Sec. 1599c-29.
"o Miller v. Plumbers Supply Co., 275 Ky. 647, 122 S. W. (2d) 477
(1938).
EM1PLOYER-EIMPLOYEE RELATIONS ACT
prior to entry of an award.2 7 Under most statutes, withdrawal
is not allowed once the parties have agreed to arbitrate.28
The Kentucky Constitution empowers the general assembly
to provide for the settlement of "differences" by arbitration. 29
Pursuant thereto the legislature has provided for arbitration by
court order 30 and arbitration by written agreement without
court order.3" It should be noted, however, that under these
provisions only controversies which are or might be the subject
of a cause of action may be submitted to arbitration. As a
result, unless amended to cover "differences" broadly, the
present statutes are inadequate for many types of labor disputes
-such as a strike to procure a collective agreement, or a dispute
as to the terms of a proposed agreement. 32
Arbitration clauses in collective agreements are becoming
more and more common. However, their real value, in such
cases, turns upon whether or not such agreements are specifically
enforceable. Statutes in many states make them so. 33
There have been no cases before the Kentucky Court of
Appeals passing directly on the question as to whether or not an
agreement to arbitrate difference arising under a contract is
specifically enforceable. 34 However, the new Kentucky labor
act appears to have settled this question. The statute provides
that "Nothing in this Section shall apply where a joint wage
Jones v. Jones, 229 Ky. 71, 16 S. W. (2d) 503 (1929).
"No Kentucky Cases have discussed this point, so far as I know
But see Smith and De Lancey, supra footnote 7, at pages 1025-31, for
an excellent collection of statutes and authorities on this point, as it
applies to labor cases. See also, case note, (1940) 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
64.
- Ky. Const. Sec. 250.
"Kentucky Code (Carroll, 1938) Sec. 451.
Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1938) Sec. 69-72.
In In re Buffalo & Erie Railway Co., 250 N. Y. 275, 165 N. E.
291 (1929), the court refused to appoint arbitrators where the pur-
pose of the arbitration purported to be to fix terms of a proposed
agreement. But, the court did suggest that, perhaps, legislation could
make voluntary agreements to arbitrate such questions specifically
enforceable.
" See statutes and cases, cited in Walsh on Equity (1930), p. 326-
327; Cook, Cases on Equity (1932) p. 541, footnote 18.
" Such a problem should not be confused with whether or not an
award under an arbitration agreement is specifically enforceable.
On this latter point, whether or not specific performance will be
granted depends upon what the award involves. Thus, in Pawling
v. Jackman, 16 Ky. 1 (1795), specific performance of an award to
convey land will lie, and in Turpin v. Banton, 3 Ky. 32 (1808), specific
performance of an award to pay a sum of money will not lie.
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agreement now exists or may hereafter exist in any industry
which by its terms and provisions provides for settlement of
disputes. Any dispute which may arise shall be settled by the
terms and provisions of said contract.'' 35 This becomes
apparent when read in the light of the provision with respect
to public policy, that "Peaceful and amicable conciliation,
mediation and arbitration of disputes between employees should
be, and hereby is declared to be the public policy of this Com-
monwealth," 36 and the provision that "When used in this Act,
unless the context otherwise expressly provides,... (d)
'Shall' is mandatory, . '. .3 As a result, agreements to
settle disputes arising out of collective agreements by arbitra-
tion are specifically enforceable.
With respect to involuntary arbitration, that is, com-
pulsory or forced arbitration of any or all disputes, regardless
of consent, it would seem sufficient to point out that a provision
in the Kansas Industrial Act 3 8 to this effect was declared
unconstitutional, when applied to regulation of wages and hours,
by the Supreme Court of the United State in Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations.39 As the Supreme Court said
in its opinion: "The system of compulsory arbitration which the
act establishes is intended to compel, and if sustained will
compel, the owner and employees to continue the business on
terms which are not of their making. It will constrain them
not merely to respect the terms if they continue the business,
but will constrain them to continue the business on those terms.
. . . . Such a system infringes the liberty of contract and
rights of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Such a procedure as involuntary
arbitration has no place in our economic, social and political
system.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the new Employer-
Employee Relations Act is indicative of progress. Whether
slower than some would have it, or faster than some think safe,
we have moved forward. That, in itself, is most encouraging.
'Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin May, 1940) Sec. 1599c-29.
"Kentucky Statutes (Baldwin, May, 1940) supra footnote 35,
Sec. 1599c-28.
' Baldwin's supra footnote 28, Sec. 1599c-4.
"
8 Kan. Gen. Stat. (1915) Sec. 44-601 et seq.
' 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923); 267 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct.
441 (1925).
